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Abstract
This paper argues that preconditions for welfare beneﬁt entitle-
ments based on labour market prospects can be counterproductive
when they create an incentive for individuals to abstain from any in-
vestment earlier in life that could improve future prospects. Beneﬁt
entitlements based partly on investments made prior to labour market
entry are then Pareto-improving.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Whilst few would disagree with the principle of providing welfare payments
to those out of work or unable to work, much debate centers on the correct
design of beneﬁt systems. Most countries adopt a means-tested beneﬁts ap-
proach despite the potential disincentive eﬀects. The biggest disadvantage
of means-tested beneﬁts is the way they change behaviour through altering
work incentives. They discourage individuals from increasing their income
and individuals at the margin of beneﬁta n dw o r ko f t e ng e ts t u c ki nt h e
beneﬁt trap, where the returns to paid employment do not compensate for
the loss of beneﬁt entitlement. The recent generation of in-work transfer
programs have been designed to address this issue, (such as the Earned In-
come Tax Credit, in the US and the Working Families’ Tax Credit, in the
UK). These programs allow those in work, but on low incomes, to retain
some beneﬁt rights. Whist such schemes can tackle this incentive problem
it can be argued that the system remain ﬂawed in that it judges an individ-
uals beneﬁt entitlement according to their current income rather then their
earnings potential. Further, means-tested beneﬁts are both ineﬃcient and
inequitable in that they can not sort individuals according to their labour
market potential.
It can be argued that what is important in judging entitlements to ben-
eﬁts is not an individuals current income and wealth but their potential to
earn and be successful in the labour market. As a result, in many OECD
1countries in the last few decades there has been a tendency to make beneﬁts
more contingent on low potential (rather then current means). Blundell and
McCurdy (1999) for instance mention that in many US states, total welfare
payments (including food stamps, child beneﬁts and housing support) are
substantially higher for lone mothers with children than for single men in
unemployment. In Holland, unemployed individuals are ranked according to
t h ee a s ew i t hw h i c ht h e yw o u l db ea b l et oﬁnd a job (i.e. their labour mar-
ket potential) and those with low labour market potential are not required to
search for jobs, eﬀectively making them entitled to higher net beneﬁts. Sim-
ilar arrangements hold in many EU-countries. Sorting individuals according
to earnings power allows governments to more accurately target beneﬁts at
the most needy and allow for greater equity and eﬃciency in the allocation
of beneﬁts.
However, when we also consider choices that are made before the labour
market and that are furthermore irreversible (such as schooling or fertility),
the reliance on indicators of having a very low potential for obtaining and
maintaining good jobs can be counter productive. Faced with beneﬁts that
are contingent on having no opportunities in the labour market, individuals
on the ‘margin’ of the talent distribution face a stark choice earlier in their
lives. They can make investments that will give them some chance of good
future jobs, but that will cost them entitlement to welfare beneﬁts, or they
can abstain from any such productive investment altogether in favour of irre-
versible choices that actually make their future job market prospects bleak.
2Looking forward, they may choose to become a ‘lost cause’ in order to be
eligible for welfare payments. This essentially puts them on a career path of
welfare dependance.
In this paper the possibility that irreversible choices earlier in life may
be negatively aﬀected by beneﬁts contingent on low potential is examined in
further detail. The focus on choices made before entering the labour market
sets the analysis apart from current models which highlight the distortionary
eﬀect of beneﬁts, such as that by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) or the papers
discussed in Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), where unemployment beneﬁts
only have an eﬀect on the characteristics of the individuals after entering the
labour market.
2B a c k g r o u n d
The basic argument for basing beneﬁts on potential are in order to avoid
m o r a lh a z a r dp r o b l e m sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hm e a n st e s t e db e n e ﬁts (Akerlof 1978).
Restricting beneﬁt entitlements according to labour market earnings poten-
tial can reduce the number of people in the beneﬁtt r a p ,i.e. the number
of individuals for whom looking for work pays less than remaining on bene-
ﬁts. Such poverty traps resulting from beneﬁt systems are well-illustrated by
Harris (1993, page 456-457) who argues that many households in US inner-
cities regard beneﬁts as a career-choice. Having stringent beneﬁt conditions
reduces the number of individuals that can do this. This moral hazard aspect
of unemployment beneﬁt has been extensively studied in the literature (e.g.
3Hopenhayn and Nicollini, 1997).
The move to preconditions for welfare beneﬁt entitlements based on labour
market prospects solves this problem and as such many governments are
opting for such systems. However, whilst solving the incentive problems for
those already of working age such systems introduce perverse incentives for
those about to enter the labour force (i.e. school leavers). When beneﬁt
entitlement becomes contingent on having low labour market opportunities,
individuals on the ‘margin’ of the talent/ability distribution face the choice
of making investments that will give them some chance of good future jobs,
but that will cost them entitlement to welfare beneﬁts, or abstaining from
any such productive investment altogether in favour of (possibly irreversible)
choices that actually make the future job market prospects poor. Thus op-
timally choosing to become a ‘lost cause’ in order to secure eligibility for
welfare payments.
The study of Harris (1993) also highlights this downside. Harris tries to
make plausible that the US inner city phenomenon of households with sev-
eral generations of child-rearing women without husbands can be partially
attributed to the fact that beneﬁts are withdrawn if husbands are present.
A similar forward-looking mechanism is implicit in studies that look at the
eﬀect of welfare beneﬁts on fertility choices of teenagers. That is, the de-
cision to be a young lone mother may be an endogenous response to low
educational expectations. Rosenzweig (1999) ﬁnds a positive response of
out-of-marriage fertility of women as a result of increases in beneﬁt entitle-
4ments to the AFDC program. Clarke and Strauss (1998) ﬁnd elasticities of
illegitimacy with respect to levels of welfare payments of around 1.5. Looking
at the relationship between various human capital investments in the NLSY,
Klepinger et al. (1999), ﬁnd that low fertility and low formal education
and low work experience all correlate positively with one another and reduce
future work opportunities. Havemann and Wolfe (2001) ﬁnd further indica-
tions that US youngsters do anticipate the eﬀect of their actions on future
received beneﬁts and change their fertility choices accordingly. Reviewing
the empirical evidence for the US based on state variation in beneﬁts, they
ﬁnd strong positive eﬀects on fertility when the diﬀerence between beneﬁts
for those without children and the beneﬁts for those with children is greater.
Taken to its extreme, this would suggest that eﬀort exerted whilst still at
school becomes the screening tool in the beneﬁt system rather than earnings
potential at the time the individual wishes to take up their beneﬁte n t i -
tlement. Possible policy instruments for such ‘school eﬀort’ preconditioned
beneﬁt entitlements might be an individual’s truancy rates or home work
records, whilst at school, or the presence of a teenage pregnancy etc.
Here these issues are address by developing a simple equilibrium model
where individuals in the labour market choose a search eﬀort that is un-
observable. This search eﬀort is combined with labour market potential to
produce a job-ﬁnding probability. Given a level of labour market potential,
we get the standard ﬁnding that unemployment beneﬁts reduce the incentives
for ﬁnding jobs and reduce search eﬀort.
5This standard set-up is then extended with a ﬁrst, pre-labour market,
period in which individuals who diﬀer in initial talent have to spend eﬀort
to increase their future labour market potential. Governments are assumed
to give a beneﬁt entitlement to all those with a labour market potential be-
low a certain cut-oﬀ point. The fact that beneﬁts are only received if the
individuals labour market potential is suﬃciently low enough, has the eﬀect
that very high talented individuals behave as if there were no beneﬁts at all,
whereas very low talent individuals behave as if they were certain of beneﬁt
entitlement. Individuals with talents in a certain middle range will however
make less eﬀort to improve their labour market potential than they would
have done if there were no beneﬁts or if there was a universal beneﬁt. This
reduces the average labour market potential and increases actual unemploy-
ment rates. This eﬀect also leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria of
poverty levels at constant levels of the government budget: in equilibria with
stringent beneﬁt entitlement requirements, these stringent requirements can
lead to very low levels of prior investments, which leads to high unemploy-
ment and poverty later. In equilibria with less stringent beneﬁt entitlement
requirements, individuals invest more eﬀort in previous periods and subse-
quent unemployment and poverty are lower.
Governments can improve the outcome by conditioning beneﬁts not only
on actual labour market potential, but also on invested eﬀort, such as school
attendance. Under quite general conditions, making beneﬁt entitlements
conditional on minimum eﬀort requirements is Pareto-improving. The higher
6the labour market potential, the higher the minimum eﬀort requirements.
Equivalently, given a certain level of labour market potential, the higher
t h er e w a r df o rh a v i n gl o wi n i t i a lt a l e n t s ,w h i c hi sa na r g u m e n tf o rp o s i t i v e
discrimination (Coate and Lowry 1993).
Then the optimal allocation of beneﬁts under welfare maximization is con-
sidered. The ﬁnding there, is that under most search technologies, beneﬁts
should increase with previous eﬀort in order to give individuals incentives to
increase their labour market potential. Only when previous eﬀort and search
eﬀort are perfect substitutes, any conditioning on earlier eﬀort is ineﬀective
because individuals will then substitute later search eﬀort for previous eﬀort
without altering their job-ﬁnding probabilities. As a ﬁnal exercise, the re-
sults of the simple two-period model are generalised to an inﬁnite horizon
dynamic environment, which is not found to qualitatively alter the previous
results.
Our model, whilst addressing the questions relating speciﬁcally to ben-
eﬁts raised above, also contributes to the existing theoretical literature on
moral hazard and beneﬁts more generally. Heckman et al. (1998) propose
one of many models that explicitly looks at the relation between human cap-
ital formation and later uncertainty. However, in their model uncertainty is
homogeneous and not subject to choice. Niccolini and Hopenhayn (1997),
in a much simpler framework, already provide a model with which one can
calculate one-shot optimal beneﬁt paths that take account of current moral
hazard. This model was extended by Zhao (2000) to allow for beneﬁts to
7depend on full labour market histories, including earlier eﬀo r tt h a ta ﬀected
both employment risks and income risks. Although Zhao’s model is only
solved analytically for the very restrictive case that there are only two possi-
ble eﬀort level choices, it can in principle be extended quite easily to be able
to compute optimal beneﬁts for any parameterization of the model in this
paper also. Hence, this papers important contribution is that it analytically
solves the problem of the eﬀect of beneﬁts conditional on low labour market
potential when eﬀort levels are continuous. Contrary to any of the mentioned
papers, this paper additionally analyses what pareto-improvements are pos-
sible under current circumstances, quite apart from what would be optimal
in a more abstract welfare maximizing sense.
3 The Model
3.1 The second period
Consider a continuum of individuals with an observable labour market po-
tential α>0 which has a cumulative probability distribution function A(α).
Individuals search for jobs and have a probability of ﬁnding a production
site equal to 1>g (α,s) > 0, where s>0 can be seen as the eﬀort put
into search in the second period. The standard search assumptions apply:
g(0,0) = 0,g (∞,∞)=1 ,g α,g s ≥ 0,g ss,g αα < 0. Throughout, s will be
regarded as unobservable and is the source of a moral hazard problem. If
individuals ﬁnd a production facility, they produce and receive an income net
8of taxes equal to P.1 Jobs are homogeneous, which means we abstract from
any productivity-increasing eﬀect that beneﬁts may have when jobs are not
homogeneous and beneﬁts improve incentives for looking for the right jobs
(such as in Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, 2000, or Marimon and Zillibotti,
1999).
Individuals maximize:
U(y,e,s)=u(y) − s − e
e,s ≥ 0 (1)
where u(y),“ ﬁnancial utility”, is strictly concave, increasing and with u(0) <
0; y denotes monetary income; e denotes an eﬀort level made earlier in life
and is for now taken constant and unobservable. As in Gruber (1997) and
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), we assume that the basic motivation be-
hind beneﬁts is risk-aversion on the part of individuals. Here, this is labelled
as poverty relief: the government has a ﬁxed budget M t os p e n do np o v e r t y
relief that can be spent on entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts b.P o v e r t y
is deﬁned as having a ﬁnancial utility less than a ﬁxed level, say 0. Mini-
mizing poverty then means that beneﬁts are such that those on beneﬁts are
1An important alternative to this type of economy with production sites (such as the
island analogy of Galor and Lach, 1990), is to have a search model in the vein of Pissarides
(1990). In those latter models, search frictions also matter for wages and individual
behaviour has macro-economic spillover eﬀects through matching. Hence such a set-up
creates two extra market distortions, namely wage distortions and search externalities.
Wanting to focus on moral hazard as the main source of market imperfection, we abstract
from these other distortions, as is also done by for instance Moen (1997).
9exactly on a ﬁnancial utility of 0. Hence b solves u(b)=0 . For the optimal
level of search intensity of an individual it has to hold that:
[u(P) − u(b ∗ B(α))]gs − 1=0 (2)
where B(.) is 1 if an individual is entitled to beneﬁts and 0 otherwise. From
this condition it directly follows that search intensity will be lower when an
individual is entitled to beneﬁts.
We assume the policy is to give beneﬁt entitlements ﬁrst to individu-
als with the lowest labour market potential and upwards until the available
budget runs out, which occurs at α∗, which has to solve,
α
∗ =a r g {b
Z A(α∗)
0
[1 − g(α,s(α))]dA(α)=M}. (3)
Hence B(α)=Iα∗>α. Whether this actually minimizes the number of indi-
viduals living in poverty for a given distribution of α is unknown2 but the
level of α∗ is common knowledge and individuals can take account of this in
ap r e v i o u sp e r i o d .
2In the appendix it is shown that this policy minimizes the number of people in poverty
only for speciﬁcf o r m so fg : it is only poverty minimizing if 0 ≥
d{g(α,s|B=0)−g(α,s|B=1)}
dα




dα which is the case iﬀ gαs ≥ gs
gssα
gss which




dα > 0 and it would actually be poverty minimizing to give beneﬁt entitlements
to those with high potential. Then the justiﬁcation for giving beneﬁts to those with lower
α would have to depend on other considerations, such as valuing equal expected utility.
103.2 The ﬁrst period: endogenous α
Suppose individuals live two periods. The second period is as described
above. In the ﬁrst period, labour market potential is produced, i.e. α =
q ∗ e. Here q denotes an non-negative innate talent or quality q which is
drawn from a cumulative distribution Q with Q(0) = 0.I nt h i sﬁrst period
individuals must choose their eﬀort level e, which can be interpreted as school
attendance, time spent making homework, making sure to use contraceptives,
etc.
We ﬁnd the rational expectations equilibrium by solving individual be-
haviour for a given α∗. In equilibrium, the outcome of these choices, i.e.
A(α|α∗), must solve (3). Such an α∗ is termed a feasible α∗.
Given α∗, individuals have to take account of the fact that when they
choose an e that is very high, they may become ineligible for beneﬁts the
second period. If beneﬁts were not dependent on α, t h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
tells us that individuals would set e such that,
qFgα =1 (4)
s.t. e ≥ 0
with F = u(P)−u(b). Denote the resulting level of α by αF(q) whereby the
subscript denotes that this is the level of α when the utility diﬀerence between
work and unemployment is F.T h e l e v e l o f α when the utility diﬀerence
between work and unemployment without beneﬁts is E = u(P) − u(0) is
11likewise denoted by αE(q). Because gαα < 0, in an interior solution there
holds αF(q) <α E(q).
Now, for the range of q for which it holds that α∗ ≥ αF(q), the optimal
level of eﬀort is obviously given by (4). Since αF(q) is increasing in q,t h e r e
is a unique level of q at which αF(q)=α∗ w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yq0. For
individuals with q>q 0, it holds that αF(q) >α ∗. For these individuals, the
option of reducing eﬀort in order to remain eligible for beneﬁts is relevant.
For individuals with q>q 0 who decide to reduce their eﬀo r ts u c ht h a tt h e y
remain eligible for beneﬁts, it is immediately obvious that their optimal level
of eﬀort will be to obtain exactly α∗. For those individuals that decide to
have an eﬀort level such that they become ineligible for beneﬁts, optimal α
and e are given by α = αE(q) and e =a r g e{qEgα =1 }. Individuals with
q>q 0 will take this latter option if and only if,
W(E,q) ≡ u(0) + g(αE(q),s(αE(q))) ∗ (u(P) − u(0)) − s(αE(q)) − arge{qEgα =1 } ≥
W(F,q) ≡ u(0) + g(α
∗(q),s(α
∗(q))) ∗ (u(P) − u(0)) − s(α






∂q holds, there is a unique quality level q1
above which individual behaviour leads to an α>α ∗. This point q1 solves,
q1 =a r g q[W(E|q>q 0)=W(F|q>q 0)]. (6)
The behaviour of the individuals with q>q 1 is in eﬀe c tt h es a m ew i t ha n d
without the existence of beneﬁts contingent on α∗ ≥ α.
12Individuals with a quality between q0 and q1 will choose their eﬀort lev-
els such that eq = α∗. From this, it follows that those with higher quality
levels, but with quality levels still below q1, have to reduce their eﬀort more
than those with lower quality level as a result of the dependence of beneﬁt
entitlement on a level of labour market potential. This is the perverse eﬀect
of allocating beneﬁts only to those with low labour market potential.
An anticipated minimum labour market potential level of α∗ hence leads
to an endogenous distribution of α that will have a mass-point at α∗. One
question is now whether there is only one feasible α∗. We can look at this
issue by looking at the change in the number of individuals receiving un-
employment beneﬁts as a result of a change in α∗. If this change is always
positive, there can be only one α∗ that exactly uses up the available budget
for poverty relief and that is hence feasible. It now holds that:
d
R A(α∗)
0 (1 − g(α,s1))dA(α|α∗)







dα∗ ∗ (1 − g(α
∗,s
1))








dα∗ ∗ (1 − g(α
∗,s
1)). (7)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side denotes the reduction in the beneﬁt
take-up resulting from the fact that the group of individuals with q0 <q<
q1 are going to increase their eﬀort levels such that they are at the new
minimum level of α∗. Although this group may reduce search levels if α
13and s are substitutes (then gαs < 0) which partially oﬀsets the eﬀect of the
increase in eﬀort, the ﬁr s tt e r ma saw h o l ec a n n o tb ep o s i t i v e( i fn o t ,t h e
original behaviour could not have been optimal). The second term denotes
the increase in beneﬁt take-up as a result of the fact that q1 increases and
that there are hence now more individuals entitled to beneﬁts. These two
counteracting eﬀects imply that if we make no further assumptions, there
can be more than one rational expectations feasible α∗.3
Given the strategy of giving beneﬁts to those with lowest labour market
potential, the optimal poverty relief policy is obviously to take the highest
feasible α∗. The possibility of many feasible α∗ however means that a gov-
ernment that does not have all the information necessary to calculate all the
feasible α∗ and that for instance uses trial-and-error to see if α∗ turns out to
be feasible in practice may be stuck at a higher level of unemployment and
poverty than necessary under the same budget.
3.3 Can the outcome be improved upon?
We take here the most informative case of the model, i.e. an interior solution
where 0 <α ∗ and 0 <q 0 <q 1. The question is now whether we can improve
upon the outcome of the model. In order to maximize the generality of
the result, we look solely at Pareto-improvements with beneﬁt preconditions
3Examples of more than one feasible α∗ can be generated by noting that the behaviour
of anyone with q<q 1 will be unaltered if we would have a diﬀerent quality distribution for
q>q 1. Hence, for any given distribution below q1 and a given feasible solution α∗, we can
pick a
dQ(q)
dq |q1 such that d
R A(α∗)
0 (1−αs1)dA(α|α∗)
dα∗ =0i nw h i c hc a s ew eh a v eac o n t i n u u mo f
feasible α∗.
14as the policy tool. We look at what could be done with information on e,
which denotes the irreversible investments made earlier in life. When there
is information on α and e, we indirectly also know q.
Withdrawing beneﬁt entitlements or having extra beneﬁt pre-conditions
on those that are already entitled is obviously not a Pareto-improvement.
Only relaxations of preconditions can be Pareto-improving. Relaxing beneﬁt
pre-conditions for the individuals with q<q 0 will have no behavioural eﬀect.
Only the relaxation of preconditions for beneﬁt entitlements for individuals
with q0 <qwill have behavioural eﬀects. A Pareto-improvement for the
group with quality levels in the range q0 <q<q 1 is to give these individuals
entitlements to beneﬁts without demanding that their labour market poten-
tial is below α∗. These individuals will then increase their labour market
potential to αF(q) >α ∗ which reduces unemployment and increases welfare.
Because q is only indirectly observable through α and e, this means that
individuals with an α above α∗ can be given beneﬁt entitlement if they have
higher levels of eﬀort e than the individuals with α∗. T h em o r ea b o v eα∗ an
individual is, the higher e should be to be entitled. The intuition is that
individuals with higher labour market potential than α∗ have to prove to
nevertheless be of low quality (q<q 1) by having made high investments in
the past.
With the money that is freed by relaxing the entitlements to beneﬁts, an
inﬁnitude of welfare Pareto-improvements are possible. The money can for
instance be used to give more individuals beneﬁte n t i t l e m e n t sw h i c hg i v e su s
15Figure 1: The relation between q, e, α, and α∗.
a minimum quality level q∗ below which individuals are entitled to beneﬁts,
q




1(e(q)q))]dQ(q)=M} >q 1. (8)
Whether this is actually the poverty minimizing level depends on whether
the distortionary eﬀect of beneﬁts on the job-ﬁnding rates is actually lower
for those with low quality. Conditioning beneﬁt entitlement on q through
conditioning it on the observed α and e, Pareto improves the current out-
come under very general circumstances however. The results of this model
sofar can be summarized in Figure 1. The thick lines denote a hypothetical
correspondence between quality and α and e respectively. In this ﬁgure, a
government interested in minimizing poverty sets a minimum labour market
potential level α∗ above which individuals are not entitled to beneﬁts in or-
der to give them maximum incentives to search. Individuals with q<q 0 had
16such a low potential that they are unaﬀected by the minimum labour market
potential as they were not going to reach that level anyway. Individuals in a
quality range q ∈ [q0,q 1] will reduce their eﬀort earlier such that their labour
market potential is exactly α∗ in order to remain entitled to beneﬁts. They
choose to become ‘hopeless’. Individuals with q>q 1 are going to supply
eﬀort in both periods as if there was no beneﬁts y s t e ma ta l l .H e n c e ,a tq1
both eﬀort and α make a discontinuous jump.
The thin lines in Figure 1 denote the possible Pareto-improvement. For
e and α, the Pareto-improvement of conditioning on e has the same eﬀect
on the individuals in the range q ∈ [q0,q 1] as unconditional beneﬁt entitle-
ment. This increases their job-ﬁnding probabilities, their utility levels, and
decreases the amount of money needed to ﬁnance this system of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. Note though, that even after the Pareto-improvement, there
is a discontinuous jump in α and e at q1, because individuals with q>q 1 do
not have beneﬁt entitlement and hence provide more eﬀort than those with
entitlement.
3.4 Welfare maximizing beneﬁts if α and e are observ-
able
Poverty minimization bounds beneﬁts from below at the poverty-avoiding
level. Welfare maximization does not impose this constraint and does not
have to neglect the utility eﬀect of eﬀort. The question is hence, what would
b(q,e) be under social welfare maximization?
17If we denote the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint by λ, in
a welfare optimizing program
dU(b,q,e)
db has to be constant for all combinations
of q and e.U s i n gt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ,w eh a v e ,
dU(b,q,e)
db
=( 1 − g(α,s))u








where the term with λ denotes the externality of individual behaviour on the






<u 0(b) which will
p i nd o w nt h ea b s o l u t el e v e lo fb e n e ﬁts when a budget is given. Manipulating
the general equation, we ﬁnd,
0=( 1− g(α,s))[u





From this we can see that the relation between optimal beneﬁts and earlier life
eﬀorts will be determined by two eﬀects: the ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of higher
eﬀort on unemployment probabilities through the term (1−g(α,s))[u0(b)−λ].
The second eﬀect is the eﬀect of beneﬁts on search distortions through the
term λb∂s
∂bgs = λb ∗
g2
su0(b)
gssF .N o w ,w e c a n ﬁnd the optimal beneﬁtp r o ﬁle by
calculating db
de and db



























We may note that because in an optimal welfare program d2U
d2b < 0, the
numerator of db
de has to be positive. If not, then the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle could
not be optimal because a welfare-improvement would have been possible by
reducing beneﬁts at that point. The sign of db







gss }. The ﬁrst part of this term is the positive eﬀect
of higher earlier eﬀort on employment rates. This makes beneﬁts increasing
in eﬀort in order to give individuals an incentive to avoid unemployment. The
second part (= −{gαs−gs
gssα
gss }) relates to the change in search distortions due
to beneﬁte n t i t l e m e n t sw h e ne increases. This term is also usually positive
(see appendix), mainly because search has the greatest marginal eﬀect when
earlier eﬀort is low: the distortions at low earlier eﬀort levels are relatively
large, making it optimal to reduce beneﬁts more when individuals have low
earlier eﬀort levels.
Note, db
de =0only in the extreme case of perfect substitutability when
g(α,s)=g(α + s). T h e na n yh i g h e re a r l i e re ﬀort e is perfectly compensated
by lower later search eﬀort s. With perfect substitutability all that would
happen if beneﬁts would increase with earlier eﬀort is that individuals would
choose a lower later search eﬀort, making the conditioning on earlier eﬀort
useless. Without perfect substitution, optimal beneﬁts increase in earlier
19eﬀort, i.e. db
de > 0.
For these ﬁndings to be applicable in any practical scheme however, we
would need detailed information on u(.) and g, of which at least u(.) is con-
sidered immeasurable by many economists. This severely reduces the em-
pirical usefulness of the welfare maximizing beneﬁt scheme. For the Pareto-
improvement above to be implemented, all that is needed is information on
α and e.
4 A dynamic model
So far, employment was taken to be a one-shot game. Here we brieﬂye x a m -
ine whether the qualitative ﬁndings of the previous model carry over when
individuals live inﬁnite periods in which they can search, maintain and loose
jobs in continuous time.
Employed individuals become unemployed at an exogenous separation
rate δ. Individuals choose an e in the ﬁrst period and, from the second period
till inﬁnity onwards, search in continuous time for jobs while unemployed. We
do not allow for individual income smoothing because one of unemployment
beneﬁts’ main role is to help individuals to smooth income (see Gruber,
1997). The value of a job and of unemployment are denoted as V J and V U











(ρ + δ + g(α,s))
u(p)+(1−
g(α,s)
(ρ + δ + g(α,s))
)u(b)−
(ρ + δ)
(ρ + δ + g(α,s))
s.
(13)
Now, if we deﬁne s∗ =
(ρ+δ)
(ρ+δ+g(α,s))s and g∗ =
s∗g(α,s)








Since at any optimal solution it has to hold that
∂g∗
∂s∗ > 0 and
∂2g∗
∂2s∗ < 0, the
maximization of ρV U with respect to s∗ has the same properties in equilib-
rium as the maximization of utility with respect to s in the previous section.
If there is again an initial period in which individuals choose e a n di fa
government conditions beneﬁt entitlement on low α, then the same Pareto-
improvement as in the two-period model is possible in the inﬁnite period case
also. Optimal beneﬁts can be calculated analogue to (10).
5 Conclusions and discussion
Beneﬁts for individuals who are not self-suﬃcient generate two moral hazard
problems. The ﬁrst moral hazard problem is that it reduces incentives to
21search for jobs while on the labour market. A second moral hazard problem
generated by welfare beneﬁts is that it decreases the incentives to make
an eﬀort earlier in life to have a high labour market potential later in life.
This second moral hazard problem interacts with the ﬁrst and leads to the
possibility that preconditioning beneﬁt entitlement on being unable to ﬁnd a
job may help create a group of individuals who really are unable to ﬁnd a job
and who would still have low job-ﬁnding-probabilities (at least to well-paying
jobs) if beneﬁts would be withdrawn at that moment.
An eﬃciency increasing change for a future generation is to condition not
only on labour market possibilities, but to condition on investments made
earlier in life also. Conditioning future beneﬁts on school attendance and
‘school eﬀort’ is one policy option to give incentives to make investments
earlier in life, whilst still allowing for the possibility that even school at-
tendance does not guarantee good labour market opportunities because of
heterogeneous talents.
Whether it is wise to condition (the height of) beneﬁts on things like
prior school attendance and school eﬀort depends on several so far unmen-
tioned eﬀects of such conditioning. For one, conditioning future beneﬁts on
prior school attendance will increase the leverage that schools have on their
students. It will furthermore crowd out the activities that non-attending stu-
dents currently perform. Whether the net eﬀect is welfare improving depends
on a valuation of these eﬀects also.
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25Appendix: implicationof speciﬁc functional forms
for g.

































We ﬁrst look at possible g(.) for a single index-function g(x(α,s)) where,
because of the boundedness of g, there has to hold g000 > 0 and g0g000 =( g00)2.
We can then look at some cases with complementarity and substitutability
between α and s :
• Complementarity with gαα < 0: x(α,s)=αs. Then gsα = g0 + αsg00
and gssα = α(sαg000 +2 g00). Then gαs − gs
gssα
gss = −g0 < 0. For g(x)=
1 − e−bx for instance, this means that gαs − gs
gssα





For g(x)=1 − 1
1+bx, we have gαs − gs
gssα
gss = −b





• Complementarity with gαα <> 0: x(α,s)=f(α)s with f0 > 0 and
26f00 > 0. Then gsα = f0g0 + sff0g00 and gssα =2 ff0g00 + sf0f2g000. Then
gαs − gs
gssα





• Substitutability: x(α,s)=α + s. Then, gsα = g00 < 0 and gssα = g000.
Also, gαs − gs
gssα





For none-single index function we ﬁnd diﬀerent results.
• Additive substitutability: g(.)=f(α)+h(s) with f,h,h0,f0 > 0,





• Multiplicative complementarity: g(.)=f(α)h(s) with f and h as











dα > 0 with single-index functions without per-














1−g − {gαs − gs
gssα
gss } :
• g = g(αs). Then D = g0 > 0.
• g = g(α + s). Then D =0 .
• g = g(f(α)s). then D = f0g0 −
(g0)3f0
g00(1−g) > 0
27• g(.)=f(α)+h(s). Then D =
f0h0
(1−g) > 0.





We hence ﬁnd in these examples that D>0 unless there is perfect sub-
stitution, in which case D =0 .
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